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Abstract
In this paper we present a case-study in which the tool UPPAAL is extended and applied to verify
an audio-control protocol developed by Philips. The size of the protocol studied in this paper is signi-
ficantly larger than case studies, including various abstract versions of the same protocol without bus-
collision handling, reported previously in the community of real-time verification. We have checked
that the protocol will function correctly if the timing error of its components is bound to ±5%, and
incorrectly if the error is±6%. In addition, using UPPAAL’s ability of generating diagnostic traces, we
have studied an erroneous version of the protocol actually implemented by Philips, and constructed a
possible execution sequence explaining the error. During the case-study, UPPAAL was extended with
the notion of committed locations. It allows for accurate modelling of atomic behaviours, and more
importantly, it is utilised to guide the state-space exploration of the model checker to avoid exploring
unnecessary interleavings of independent transitions. Our experimental results demonstrate consider-
able time and space-savings of the modified model checking algorithm. In fact, due to the huge time
and memory-requirement, it was impossible to check a simple reachability property of the protocol
before the introduction of committed locations, and now it takes only seconds.
© 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Inc.
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1. Introduction
In the past decade a number of tools for automatic verification of hybrid and real-time
systems have emerged, e.g. HYTECH [13], KRONOS [23], PMC [22], RT-Cospan [3] and
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UPPAAL [18]. These tools have by now reached a state, where they are mature enough for
industrial applications. In this paper, we substantiate the claim by reporting on an industry-
size case study where the tool UPPAAL is applied.
We analyse an audio-control protocol developed by Philips for the physical layer of an
interface bus connecting the various devices e.g. CD-players, amplifier, etc. in audio equip-
ments. It uses Manchester encoding to transmit bit sequences of arbitrary length between
the components, whose timing errors are bound. A simplified version of the protocol is
studied by Bosscher et al. [8]. It is showed that the protocol is incorrect if the timing error
of the components is ± 117 or greater. The proof is carried out without tool support. The first
automatic analysis of the protocol is reported in [16] where HYTECH is applied to check an
abstract version of the protocol and automatically synthesise the upper bound on the timing
error. Similar versions of the protocol have been analysed by other tools, e.g. UPPAAL [18]
and KRONOS [23]. However, all the proofs are based on a simplification on the protocol,
introduced by Bosscher et al. in 1994, that only one sender is transmitting on the bus so
that no bus collisions can occur. In many applications the bus will have more than one
sender, and the full version of the protocol by Philips therefore handles bus collisions. The
protocol with bus collision handling was manually verified in [11] without tool support.
Since 1994, it has been a challenge for the verification tool developers to automate the
analysis on the full version of the protocol.
The first automated proof of the protocol with bus collision handling was presented in
1996 in the conference version of this paper [4]. It was the largest case study, reported
in the literature on verification of timed systems, which has been considered as a primary
example in the area (see [9,20]). The size of the protocol studied is significantly larger than
various simplified versions of the same protocol studied previously in the community, e.g.
the discrete part of the state space (the node-space) is 103 times larger than in the case
without bus collision handling and the number of clocks, variables and channels in the
model is also increased considerably.
The major problem in applying automatic verification tools to industrial-size systems
is the huge time and memory-usage needed to explore the state-space of a network (or
product) of timed automata, since the verification tools must keep information not only
on the control structure of the automata but also on the clock values specified by clock
constraints. It is known as the state-space explosion problem. We experienced the problem
right on the first attempt in checking a simple reachability property of the protocol using
UPPAAL, which did not terminate in hours though it was installed on a super computer with
giga bytes of main memory. We observed that in addition to the size and complexity of the
problem itself, one of the main causes to the explosion was the inaccurate modelling of
atomic behaviours and inefficient search of the unnecessary interleavings of atomic behav-
iours by the tool. As a simple solution, during the case-study, UPPAAL was extended with
the notion of committed locations. It allows for accurate modelling of atomic behaviours,
and more importantly, it is utilised in the state-space exploration of the model checker
to avoid exploring unnecessary interleavings of independent transitions. Our experimental
results demonstrate that the modified model-checking algorithm consume less time and
space than the original algorithm. In fact, due to the huge time and memory-requirement,
it was impossible to check certain properties of the protocol before the introduction of
committed locations, and now it takes only seconds.
The automated analysis was originally carried out using an UPPAAL version extended
with the notion of committed location installed on a super computer, a SGI ONYX machine
[4]. To make a comparison, in this paper we present an application of the current version
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(version 3.2) of UPPAAL, also supporting committed location, installed on an ordinary
Pentium II 375 MHz PC machine, to the protocol. We have checked that the protocol will
function correctly if the timing error of its components is bound to ±5%, and incorrectly if
the error is ±6%. In addition, using UPPAAL’s ability of generating diagnostic traces, we
have studied an erroneous version of the protocol actually implemented by Philips in their
audio products, and constructed a possible execution sequence explaining a known error.
The paper is organised as follows: In Sections 2 and 3 we present the UPPAAL model
with committed location and describe its implementation in the tool. In Section 4 and 5 the
Philips audio-control protocol with bus collision is informally and formally described. The
analysis of the protocol is presented in Section 6 where we also compare the performance
of the current UPPAAL version with the one used in [4]. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Finally, formal descriptions of the protocol components are enclosed in Appendix A.
2. Committed locations
The basis of the UPPAAL model for real-time systems is networks of timed automata
extended with data variables [2,14,24]. However, to meet requirements arising from various
case-studies, the UPPAAL model has been extended with various new features such as
urgent transitions [6], etc. The present case-study indicates that we need to further extend
the UPPAAL model with committed locations to model atomic behaviours such as multi-
way synchronisations and atomic broadcasting in real-time systems. Our experiences with
UPPAAL show that the notion of committed locations introduced in UPPAAL is not only
useful in modelling but also yields significant improvements in performance.
We assume that a real-time system consists of a fixed number of sequential processes
communicating with each other via channels. We further assume that each communication
synchronises two processes as in CCS [21]. Broadcasting communication can be imple-
mented in such systems by repeatedly sending the same message to all the receivers. To
ensure atomicity of such “broadcast” sequences we mark the intermediate locations of the
sender, which are to be executed immediately, as so-called committed locations.
2.1. An example
To introduce the notion of committed locations in timed automata, consider the scenario
shown in Fig. 1. A sender S is to broadcast a message m to two receivers R1 and R2. As
this requires synchronisation between three processes this cannot directly be expressed in
the UPPAAL model, where synchronisation is between two processes with complementary
actions. As an initial attempt we may model the broadcast as a sequence of two two-
process synchronisations, where first S synchronises with R1 on m1 and then with R2 on
m2. However, this is not an accurate model as the intended atomicity of the broadcast is
not preserved (i.e. other processes may interfere during the broadcast sequence). To ensure
atomicity, we mark the intermediate location S2 of the sender S as a committed location
(indicated by the c:-prefix). The atomicity of the action sequence m1!m2! is now achieved
by insisting that a committed sequence must be left immediately! This behaviour is similar
to what has been called “urgent transitions” [6,10,12], which insists that the next transition
taken must be an action (and not a delay), but the essential difference is that no other
actions should be performed in between such an atomic sequence. The precise semantics
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Fig. 1. Broadcasting communication and committed locations.
of committed locations will be formalised in the transition rules for networks of timed
automata with data variables in Section 2.3.
2.2. Syntax
We assume a finite set of clock variables C ranged over by x, y, z and a finite set of
data variables D ranged over by i, j . We use B(C) to stand for the set of clock constraints
that are the conjunctive formulas of simple constraints in the form of x ≺ n or x − y ≺ n,
where ≺ ∈ {<,,=,, >} and n is a natural number. Similarly, we use B(D) to stand
for the set of non-clock constraints that are conjunctive formulas of i ∼ j or i ∼ k, where
∼ ∈ {<,,=, 
=,, >} and k is an integer number. We use B(C,D) ranged over by g
to denote the set of formulas that are conjunctions of clock constraints and a non-clock
constraints. The elements of B(C,D) are called constraints or guards.
To manipulate clock and data variables, we use reset-sets which are finite sets of re-
set-operations. A reset-operation on a clock variable should be in the form x :=n, where
n is a natural number and a reset-operation on an data variable should be in the form:
i :=k ∗ j + k′ where k, k′ are integers. A reset-set is a proper reset-set when the variables
are assigned a value at most once, we use R to denote the set of all proper reset-sets.
We assume that processes synchronise with each other via complementary actions. Let
A be a set of action names with a subset U of urgent actions on which processes should
synchronise whenever possible. We use Act = {α? |α ∈A} ∪ {α! |α ∈A} ∪ {τ } to de-
note the set of actions that processes can perform to synchronise with each other, where
τ is a distinct symbol representing internal actions. We use name(a) to denote the action
name of a, defined by name(α?) = name(α!) = α.
An automaton A over actions Act, clock variables C and data variables D is a tuple
〈N, l0,−→, I, NC〉 where N is a finite set of locations (control-locations) with a sub-
set NC ⊆ N being the set of committed locations, l0 is the initial location, −→ ⊆ N ×
B(C,D)×Act×R×N corresponds to the set of edges, and I : N → B(C) is the in-
variant assignment function. To model urgency, we require that the guard of an edge with
an urgent action is a non-clock constraint, i.e. if name(a)∈ U and 〈l, g, a, r, l′〉 ∈ −→ then
g ∈ B(D).
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In the case, 〈l, g, a, r, l′〉 ∈ −→ we shall write l g a r−→ l′ which represents a transition
from the location l to the location l′ with guard g, action a to be performed, and a sequence
of reset-operations r to update the variables. Furthermore, we shall write C(l) whenever
l ∈ NC .
To model networks of processes, we introduce a CCS-like parallel composition operator
for automata. Assume that A1, . . . , An are automata. We use A to denote their parallel
composition. The intuitive meaning of A is similar to the CCS parallel composition of
A1, . . . , An with all actions being restricted, that is, A = (A1| . . . |An)\Act. Thus only
synchronisation between the components Ai is possible. We call A a network of automata.
We simply view A as a vector and use Ai to denote its ith component.
2.3. Semantics
Informally, a process modelled by an automaton starts at location l0 with all its variables
initialised to 0. The values of the clocks may increase synchronously with time at location
l as long as the invariant condition I (l) is satisfied. At any time, the process can change
location by following an edge l g a r−→ l′ provided the current values of the variables satisfy
the enabling condition g. With this transition, the variables are updated by r .
To formalise the semantics we shall use variable assignments. A variable assignment is
a mapping which maps clock variables C to the non-negative reals and data variablesD to
integers. For a variable assignment u and a delay d, u⊕d denotes the variable assignment
such that (u⊕d)(x) = u(x)+ d for a clock variable x and (u⊕d)(i) = u(i) for any data
variable i. This definition of ⊕ reflects that all clocks proceed at the same speed and that
data variables are time-insensitive.
For a reset-set r (a proper set of reset-operations), we use r[u] to denote the variable
assignment u′ with u′(w) = Value(e)u whenever (w :=e) ∈ r and u′(w′) = u(w′) other-
wise, where Value(e)u denotes the value of e in u. Given a constraint g ∈ B(C,D) and a
variable assignment u, g(u) is a boolean value describing whether g is satisfied by u or not.
A control vector l of a network A is a vector of locations, where li is a location of
Ai . We write l[l′i/ li] to denote the vector, where the ith element li of l is replaced by l′i .
Furthermore, we shall write C(l) whenever C(li) for some i.
A state of a network A is a configuration (l, u), where l is a control vector of A and u is
a variable assignment. The initial state of A is (l0, u0), where l0 is the initial control vector
whose elements are the initial locations l0i of Ai’s and u0 is the initial variable assignment
that maps all variables to 0.
The semantics of a network of automata A is given in terms of a transition system with
the set of states being the configurations. The transition relation is defined by the following
three rules, which are standard except that each rule has been augmented with conditions
handling control-vectors with committed locations:
• (l, u) (l[l′i/ li], ri[u]) if li
gi τ ri−→ l′i and gi(u) for some li , gi , ri , and for all k if C(lk)
then C(li);
• (l, u) (l[l′i/ li , l′j / lj ], (rj ∪ ri)[u]) if li
gi α! ri−→ l′i , lj
gj α? rj−→ l′j , gi(u), gj (u), and i 
= j ,
for some li , lj , gi , gj , α, ri , rj , and for all k if C(lk) then C(li) or C(lj );
• (l, u)  (l, u⊕ d) if I (l)(u), I (l)(u⊕ d), ¬C(l) and no li giα?ri−→ , lj gj α!rj−→ such that
gi(u), gj (u), α ∈ U, i 
= j , li , lj , ri and rj ;
where I (l) =∧i I (li).
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Intuitively, the first rule describes a local internal action transition in a component, and
possibly the resetting of variables. An internal transition can occur if the current variable
assignment satisfies the transition guard and if the control-location of any component is
committed, only components in committed locations may take local transitions. Thus, only
internal transitions of components in committed location may interrupt other components
operating in committed locations.
The second rule describes synchronisation transitions that synchronise two components.
If the control-location of any of the components is committed it is required that at least
one of the synchronising components starts in a committed location. This requirement
prevents transitions starting in non-committed locations from interfering with atomic (i.e.
committed) transition sequences. However, two independent committed sequences may
interfere with each other.
The third rule describes delay transitions, i.e. when all clocks increase synchronously
with time. Delay transitions are permitted only while the location invariants of all compo-
nents are satisfied. Delays are not permitted if the control-location of a component in the
network is committed, or if an urgent transition (i.e. a synchronisation transition with ur-
gent action) is possible. Note that the guards on urgent transitions are non-clock constraints
whose truth-values are not affected by delays.
Finally, we note that the three rules give a semantics where transition sequences marked
as committed are instantaneous in the sense that they happen without duration, and without
interference from components operating in non-committed locations.
3. Committed locations in UPPAAL
In this section we present a modified version of the model-checking algorithm of UP-
PAAL for networks of automata with committed locations.
3.1. The model-checking algorithm
The model-checking algorithm performs reachability analysis to check for invariance
properties ∀β, and reachability properties ∃♦β, with respect to a local property β of
the control locations and the values of the clock and data variables.1 It combines sym-
bolic techniques with on-the-fly generation of the state-space in order to avoid explicit
construction of the product automaton and the immediately caused memory problems. The
algorithm is based on a partitioning of the (otherwise infinite) state-space into finitely many
symbolic states of the form (l,D), where D is a constraint system (i.e. a conjunction of
clock constraints and non-clock constraints). It checks if a any part of a symbolic state
(lf ,Df ) (i.e. a state (lf , uf ) with uf ⊆ Df ) is reachable from the initial symbolic state
(l0,D0), where D0 expresses that all clock and data variables are initialised to 0 [24].
Throughout the rest of this paper we shall simply call (l,D) a state instead of symbolic
state.
The algorithm essentially performs a forwards search of the state-space. The search is
guided and pruned by two buffers: WAITING, holding states waiting to be explored and
1 From version 3.2 released in 2001, the model-checking algorithm in UPPAAL also supports liveness properties
of the kind ∀♦β and ∃β.
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PASSED holding states already explored. Initially, PASSED is empty and WAITING holds
the single state (l0,D0). The algorithm then repeats the following steps:
S1. Pick a state (l,D) from the WAITING buffer.
S2. If l = lf and D ∧Df 
= ∅ return the answer yes.
S3. a. If l = l′ and D ⊆ D′, for some (l′,D′) in the PASSED buffer, drop (l,D) and go to
step S1.
b. Otherwise, save (l,D) in the PASSED buffer.
S4. Find all successor states (ls,Ds) reachable from (l,D) in one step and store them in
the WAITING buffer.
S5. If the WAITING buffer is not empty then go to step S1, otherwise return the answer no.
We will not treat the algorithm in detail here, but refer the reader to [5,24].
Note that in step S3.b all explored states are stored in the PASSED buffer to ensure
termination of the algorithm. In many cases, it will store the whole state-space of the anal-
ysed system which grows exponentially both in the number clocks and components [24].
The algorithm is therefore bound to run into space problems for large systems. The key
question is how to reduce the growth of the PASSED buffer.
When committed locations are used to model atomic behaviours there are two potential
possibilities to reduce the size of the PASSED buffer. First, as atomic sequences in general
restrict the amount of interleaving that is allowed in a system [15], the state-space of the
system is reduced, and consequently also the number of states stored in the PASSED buffer.
Secondly, as a sequence of committed locations semantically is instantaneous and non-
interleaved with other components, it suffices to save only the (non-committed) control-
location at the beginning of the sequence in the PASSED buffer to ensure termination.
Hence, our proposed solution is simply not to save states in the PASSED buffer which
involve committed locations. We modify step S3 of the algorithm in the following way:
S3′. a. If C(l) go directly to step S4.
b. If l = l′ and D ⊆ D′, for some (l′,D′) in the PASSED buffer, drop (l,D) and go
to step S1.
c. If neither of the above steps are applicable, save (l,D) in the PASSED buffer.
So, for a given state (l,D), if l is committed the algorithm proceeds directly from step
S3′.a to step S4, thereby omitting the time-consuming step S3′.b and the space-consuming
step S3′.c. Clearly, this will reduce the growth of the PASSED buffer and the total amount of
time spent on step S3′. In the following step S4 more reductions are made as interleavings
are not allowed when l is committed. In fact, the next transition must be an action transition
and it must involve a li which is committed in l (according to the transition rules in the
previous section). This reduces the time spent on generating successor states of (l,D) in
S4 as well as the total number of states in the system. Finally, we note that reducing the
PASSED buffer size also yields potential time-savings in step S3′.b when l is not committed
as it involves a search through the PASSED buffer.
It should be noticed that the algorithm presented in this section is not guaranteed to
terminate if the notion of committed locations is used in an unintended way.2 For the
modified algorithm to terminate, it is assumed in the that committed locations are used to
2 In the current implemention of UPPAAL, the algorithm uses a technique presented in [17] to identify and store
at least one so-called covering state in each dynamic loop to guarantee termination for all input models.
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Fig. 2. Broadcasting using committed locations.
model atomic behaviours. In particular this means that any sequence of committed control-
locations must be of finite length.
3.2. Space and time performance improvements
To investigate the practical benefits from the usage of committed locations and its imple-
mentation in UPPAAL we perform an experiment with a parameterizable scenario, where a
sender S wants to broadcast a message to n receivers R1, . . . ,Rn. The sender S simply per-
forms n a!-transitions and then terminates, whereas the receivers are all willing to perform
a single a?-transition hereby synchronizing with the sender. The data variable k ensures
that the ith receiver participates in the ith handshake. Additionally, there are m auxiliary
automata D1, . . . ,Dm simply oscillating between two states. Consider Fig. 2, where the
control node S2 is committed (indicated by the c:-prefix).
We may now use UPPAAL to verify that the sender succeeds in broadcasting the message,
i.e. it forces all the receivers to terminate. More precisely we verify that SYSn,m =
(Sn |R1 |. . .|Rn |D1 |. . .|Dm) satisfies the formula ∃♦(at(S, S3) ∧ni=1 at(Ri ,Ri2)), where
we assume that the proposition at(A, l) is implicitly assigned to each location l of the auto-
matonA, meaning that the componentA is operating in location l. We perform two verifica-
tions, one with S2 declared as committed, and one with S2 beeing non-committed but with
a location invariant x  0, where x is a clock which is reset on the transition from S1 to S2,
preventing the automaton from delaying in location S2. The result is shown in Fig. 3.
In both test sequences the number of disturbing automata was fixed to eight. Time is mea-
Fig. 3. Time and space consumption.
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sured in seconds and space is measured in pages (4 KB). The general observation is that use
of committed locations in broadcasting saves time as well as space. The most important ob-
servation is that in the committed scenario the space consumption behaves as a constant func-
tion in the number of receivers.
4. The audio-control protocol with bus collision
In this section an informal introduction to the audio protocol with bus collision is given.
The audio control protocol is a bus protocol, all messages are received by all components
on the bus. If a component receives a message not addressed to it, the message is just
ignored. Philips allows up to 10 components.
Messages are transmitted using Manchester encoding. Time is divided into bit-slots of
equal length, a bit “1” is transmitted by an up-going edge halfway a bit-slot, a bit “0” by a
down-going edge halfway a bit-slot. If the same bit is transmitted twice in a row the voltage
must of course change at the end of the first bit-slot. Note that only a single wire is used to
connect the components, no extra clock wire is needed. This is one of the properties that
makes it a useful protocol.
The protocol has to cope with some problems: (a) The sender and the receiver must
agree on the beginning of the first bit-slot, (b) the length of the message is not known in
advance by the receiver, (c) the down-going edges are not detected by the receiver. To
resolve these problems the following is required: Messages must start with a bit “1” and
messages must end with a down-going edge. This ensures that the voltage on the wire is
low between messages. Furthermore the senders must respect a so-called “radio silence”
between the end of a message and the beginning of the next one. The radio silence
marks the end of a message and the receiver knows that the next up-going edge is the
first edge of a new message. It is almost possible, and actually mandated in the Philips
documentation, to decode a Manchester encoded message by only looking to the up-going
edges (problem c) only the last zero bit of a message cannot be detected (consider
messages “10” and “1”). To resolve this, it is required that all messages are of odd
length.
It is possible that two or more components start transmitting at the same time. The
behavior of the electric circuit is such that the voltage on the wire will be high as long as
one of the senders pulls it high. In other words, the wire implements the or-function. This
makes it possible for a sender to notice that someone else is also transmitting. If the wire
is high while it is transmitting a low, a sender can detect a bus collision. This collision
detection happens at certain points in time: Just before each up-going transition, and at one
and three quarters of a bit-slot after a down going edge (if it is still transmitting a low).
When a sender detects a collision it will stop transmitting and will try to retransmit its
message later.
If two messages are transmitted at the same time and one is a prefix of the other, the
receiver will not notice the prefix message. To ensure collision detection it is not allowed
that a message is a prefix of another message in transit. In the Philips environment this
restriction is met by embedding the source address in each message (and assigning each
component a unique source address).
In Fig. 4 an example is depicted. Assume two senders, named A and B, that start trans-
mitting at exactly the same time. Because two lines on top of each other are hard to dis-
tinguish from one line, in the picture they are shifted slightly. The sender A (depicted with
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Fig. 4. An example.
thick lines) starts transmitting “11 . . .” and sender B (depicted with thin lines) “101 . . .”.
At the end of the first bit-slot sender A changes from high to low voltage, to prepare for
the next up-going edge. But one quarter after this down it detects a collision and stops
transmitting. Sender B did not notice the other sender and continues transmitting. Note
that the receiver will decode the message of the sender B correctly.
The protocol has to cope with one more thing: timing uncertainty. Because the protocol
is implemented on a processor that also has to execute a number of other time critical
tasks, a quite large timing uncertainty is allowed. A bit-slot is 888 microseconds, so the
ideal time between two edges is 888 or 444 microseconds. On the generation of edges a
timing uncertainty of ±5% is allowed. That is, between 844 and 932 for one bit-slot and
between 422 and 466 for half a bit-slot. The collision detection just before an up-going
edge and the actual generation of the same up-going edge should be separated by at most
20 microseconds (according to the protocol specification). The timing uncertainty on the
collision detection appearing at the first and third quarters after a down-going edge is ±22
microseconds. Also the receiver has a timing uncertainty of ±5%. To complete the timing
information, the distance between the end of one message and the beginning of the next
must be at least 8000 microseconds (8 milliseconds).
5. A formal model of the protocol
To analyse the behavior of the protocol we model the system as a network of seven
timed automata. The network consists of two parts: a core part and a testing environment.
The core part models the components of the protocol to be implemented: two senders, a
wire and a receiver. The testing environment, consisting of two message generators (one for
each sender) and an output checker, is used to model assumptions about the environment
of the protocol and for testing the behavior of the core part. Fig. 5 shows a flow-graph of
the network where nodes represent timed automata and edges represent synchronisation
channels or shared variables, the latter enclosed within parentheses.
The general idea of the model is as follows. The two automata MessageA and MessageB
are designed to non-deterministically generate possible valid messages for the both senders
(as described in Section 4), in addition MessageA informs the Check-automaton on the bits
it generated for SenderA. The senders transmit the messages via the wire to the receiver.
We have chosen to model the wire as an automaton to separate its behaviour from the two
senders and the receiver. The receiver communicates the bits it decoded to the checker.
Thus the Check automaton is able to compare the bits generated by MessageA and the bits
received by Receiver. If this matches the protocol is correct.
The senders A and B are, modulo renaming (all A’s in identifiers to B’s), exactly the
same. Because of the symmetry, it is enough to check that the messages transmitted by
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Fig. 5. Philips audio-control protocol with bus collision.
sender A are received correctly. If a scenario exits in which a message of sender B is
received incorrectly, the same scenario (modulo renaming) exists for sender A. We will
proceed with a short description of each automaton. The definition of these uses a number
of constants that are declared in Table 1.
Table 1
Declaration of constants
The constants used in the formulas
q 2220 One quarter of a bit-slot: 222 microsecond
d 200 Detection ‘just before’ the UP:
20 microsecond
g 220 ‘Around’ 25% and 75% of the bit-slot:
22 microsecond
w 80000 The radio silence: 8 millisecond
t 0.05 The timing uncertainty: 5%
The constants in the automata
W w 80000
D d 200
A1min q-g 2000
A1max q+g 2440
A2min 3*q-g 6440
A2max 3*q+g 6880
Q2 2*q 4440
Q2minD 2*q*(1-t)-d 4018
Q2min 2*q*(1-t) 4218
Q2max 2*q*(1+t) 4662
Q3min 3*q*(1-t) 6327
Q3max 3*q*(1+t) 6993
Q5min 5*q*(1-t) 10545
Q5max 5*q*(1+t) 11655
Q7min 7*q*(1-t) 14763
Q7max 7*q*(1+t) 16317
Q9min 9*q*(1-t) 18981
Q9max 9*q*(1+t) 20979
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senderArrr
ar_Qfirst_okr fir ta sr fir ta sr fir ta s(Ax<=Q2max)( )a( )a( )a
ar_Qlast_okr l ta asr l ta asr l ta as(Ax<=Q2max)( )a( )a( )a
ar_Qlastr l ta asr l ta asr l ta as(Ad<=A2max)( )a( )a( )a
c:LS:c :c:c
do_down(Ax<=0)( )( )( )
ar_up_okra rara(Ax<=Q2max, Ad<=D)( , )a( , )a( , )a
c:ready:rc ea:rc ea:rc ea
HF(Ax<=Q2max)( )a( )a( )aHS(Ax<=Q2max)( )a( )a( )a
ar_first_up_okr fir ta sr fir ta sr fir ta s(Ad<=D)( )( )( )
ar_first_upr fir ta sr fir ta sr fir ta s(Ad<=D)( )( )( )
idlei lei lei le ar_Qfirstr fir ta sr fir ta sr fir ta s(Ad<=A1max)( )a( )a( )a
Ax>=Q2min
Ax<=Q2max
Ax:=0
Ax>=Q2minD
Ax<=Q2max
Volt>=1
Acoll!
Ax>=Q2minD
Ax<=Q2max
Volt==0
Ad:=0
Ad>=A2min, Ad<=A2max
Volt>=1, Acoll!
Ad>=A2min
Ad<=A2max
Volt==0
Aempty?
Ahead0?
Anext:=0
Ad:=Q2
Ax==0
DOWN!
Ad:=Q2
Ax>=Q2min
Ax<=Q2max
Ad<=D
Anext==0
UP!
Ax:=0
Ax>=Q2min
Ax<=Q2max
    Ad<=D
 Anext==1
      UP!
    Ax:=0
DOWN!
Ax>=Q2min
Ax<=Q2max
    DOWN!
    Ax:=0
Ax>=Q2min
Ax<=Q2max
  Ahead1?
 Anext:=1
    Ax:=0
Aempty?
Ax>=Q2min
Ax<=Q2max
Ahead0?
Ax>=Q2min
Ax<=Q2max
Ax:=0
UP!
Ad<=D
Ax:=0
Ad<=D
Volt>=1
Acoll!
Ad<=D
Volt==0
Ahead1?
w>=W
Ad:=0
 Ahead1?
Anext:=1
   Ad:=0
Ad>=A1min
Ad<=A1max
Volt==0
Ad>=A1min, Ad<=A1max
Volt>=1, Acoll!
Fig. 6. The SenderA automaton.
The senders
SenderA is depicted in Fig. 6. It takes input actions Ahead0?, Ahead1? and Aempty?.
The output actions UP! and DOWN! will be the Manchester encoding of the message. The
clock Ax is used to measure the time between UP! and DOWN! actions. The idea behind
the model (taken from [10]) is that the sender changes location each half of a bit-slot. The
locations HS (wire is High in Second half of the bit-slot) and HF (High in First half of the
bit-slot) refer to this idea. Extra locations are needed because of the collision detection.
The clock Ad is used to measure the time elapsed between the detection just before
UP! action and the corresponding UP! action. The system is in the locations ar_Qfirst and
ar_Qlast when the next thing to do is the collision test at one or three quarters of a bit-
slot. When Volt is greater than zero, at that moment, the sender detects a collision, stops
transmitting and returns to the idle location. The clock w is used to ensure the radio silence
between messages. This variable is checked on the transition from idle to ar_first_up.
The wire
This small automaton keeps track of the voltage on the wire and generates VUP! actions
when appropriate, that is when a UP? action is received when the voltage is low. The
automaton is shown in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 7. The wire automaton.
The receiver
Receiver, shown in Fig. 8, decodes the bit sequence using the up-going (modeled as
VUP?) changes of the wire. Decoded bits are signaled to the environment using out-
put actions Add0!, Add1! and OUT! (where OUT! is used for signaling the end of a de-
coded message). The decoding algorithm of the receiver is a direct translation of the
algorithm in the Philips documentation of the protocol. In the automaton each VUP? tran-
sition is followed by a transition modeling the decoding. This decoding happens at once,
therefore the intermediate locations are modeled as committed locations. The automa-
ton has two important locations, L1 and L0. When the last received bit is a bit “1” the
receiver is in location L1, after receiving a bit “0” it will be in location L0. The error
location is entered when a VUP? is received much too early. In the complete model the
error location is not reachable, see Section 6. The receiver keeps track of the parity of
the received message using the integer variable odd. When the last received bit is a bit
“1” and the message is even, a bit “0” is added to make the complete message of odd
length.
Fig. 8. The receiver automaton.
176 J. Bengtsson et al. / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 52–53 (2002) 163–181
Fig. 9. The message automata.
The message generators
The message generators MessageA and MessageB, shown in Fig. 9, generate valid mes-
sages (i.e. any message for which the protocol should behave correctly according to the
specification) for sender A and B. In addition, the messages generated for sender A are
communicated to the checker. The start of a message is signaled to the checker by AINc!,
bits by expect0! and expect1!. When a collision is detected by sender A this is communi-
cated to MessageA via Acoll?. The message generator will communicate this on his turn to
the check automaton via CAcoll!.
Generating messages of odd length is quite simple. The only problem is that it is not
allowed that a message for one sender is a prefix of the message for the other sender. To be
more precise: If only one sender is transmitting there is no prefix restriction. Only when the
two senders start transmitting at the same time, it is not allowed that one sender transmits
a prefix of the message transmitted by the other. As mentioned before the reason for this
restriction is that the prefix message is not received by the receiver and it is possible that
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the senders do not notice the collision. In other words: the prefix message can be lost. To
ensure that the two generated bit-streams differ on at least on position, the generator always
compare the last generated bit-values stored in the variables lb and Blb on the edge from
locations sending0 or sending1 to location sending. If the bits differ, the variable ok is set
to 1, which is a requirement for the message generation to end normally (on the transition
from sending to idle in the two automata).
The checker
This automaton is shown in Fig. 10. It keeps track of the bits “in transit”, i.e. the bits
that are generated by the message generators but not yet decoded by the receiver. These
bits are encoded using the two variables l, which stores the length of the bit-stream, and
r that stores the actual bit-stream in transit. Whenever a bit is decoded or the end of
the message is detected not conform the generated message the checker enters location
error. Furthermore, when sender A detects a collision the checker returns to its initial
location.
6. Verification in UPPAAL
In this section we present the results of analysing the Philips audio-control protocol
formally described in the previous section. We will use A.l to denote the (implicit) prop-
osition at(A, l) introduced in Section 3.2. Also, note that invariance properties in UPPAAL
are on the form ∀β, where β is a local property.
Fig. 10. The check automaton.
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Correctness criteria
The main correctness criterion of the protocol is to ensure that the bit sequence re-
ceived by the Receiver matches the bit sequence sent by SenderA. Moreover, the entire
bit sequence should be received by Receiver (and communicated to Check). From the de-
scription of the Check-automaton (see the previous section) it follows that this behaviour
is ensured if Check is always operating in location start or normal:
∀ (Check.start ∨ Check.normal) (1)
When the Receiver-automaton observes changes of the wire too early it changes control
to location error. If the rest of the components behave normally this should not happen.
Therefore, the Receiver-automaton is required to never reach the location error:
∀(¬Receiver.error) (2)
Incorrectness
Unfortunately the protocol described in this paper is not the protocol that Philips has
implemented. The original sender checked less often for a bus collision. The “just before
the up going edge” collision detection was only performed before the first up. In the UP-
PAAL model this corresponds to deleting outgoing transitions of ar_Qlast_ok and using
the outgoing transitions of ar_up_ok instead. This incorrect version is shown in Fig. 11.
Fig. 11. The incorrect SenderA automaton.
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Fig. 12. Error execution of the incorrect protocol.
In general the problem is that if both senders are transmitting and one is slow and the
other fast, the distance can cumulate to a high value that can confuse the receiver. UPPAAL
generated a counter-example trace to Property 1. The trace is depicted in Fig. 12. The
scenario is as follows: Sender A (depicted with thick lines) tries to transmit “111 . . .” and
sender B (depicted with thin lines) “1100 . . .”. The sender A is fast and the other slow.
This causes the distance between the second UP’s to be very big (77 microseconds). In
the third bit-slot the sender A detects the collision. The result of all this is that the time
elapsed between the VUP actions is 6.65Q instead of the ideal 6Q. Because of the timing
uncertainty in the receiver this can be interpreted as 7Q (7 ∗ 0.95 = 6.65), and 7Q is just
enough to decode “01” instead of the transmitted “0”. Thus, it is possible that the sent and
received message differ with this version of the protocol.
In the correct version this scenario is impossible, because if collision detection happens
before every UP action, the distance between the UP’s in the second bit-slot cannot be that
high (at most 20 microseconds).
It is not likely that these kind of errors happen in the actual implementation. First, it is
not likely that two senders do start at sufficiently close time-points. Secondly, the timing
uncertainty is at most 2% instead of 5%, and the “average” timing uncertainty is even less.
For more details, see [11].
Although this problem was known by Philips it is interesting to see how powerful the
diagnostic traces can be. It enables us not only to find mistakes in the model of a protocol,
but also to find design mistakes in real-life protocols.
Verification results
UPPAAL successfully verifies the correctness properties 1 and 2 for an error tolerance
of 5% on the timing. Recall that SenderA and SenderB are, modulo renaming, exactly the
same, implying that the verified properties for SenderA also applies to the symmetric case
for SenderB. The verification of properties 1 and 2 was performed in 0.5 s using 2.5 MB
of memory.
The analysis of the incorrect version of the protocol with less collision detection (dis-
cussed above) uses UPPAAL’s ability to generate diagnostic traces whenever an invari-
ant property is not satisfied by the system. The trace, consisting of 46 transitions, was
generated in 0.4 s using 2.5 MB of memory. Also, verification of Property 1 for the protocol
with full collision detection and an error tolerance of 6% on all the timing produces an error
trace as well. The scenario is similar to the one found by Bosscher et al. in [8] for the one
sender protocol.
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The properties were verified using UPPAAL version 3.2 [1,7,18] that implements the
verification algorithm handling committed locations described in Section 3. It was installed
on a Pentium II 375 MHz PC running Debian Linux 2.2. In the conference version of this
paper [4] we reported that the same protocol was verified using UPPAAL version 0.963
installed on a SGI ONYX machine. The verification of the two correctness properties then
consumed 7.5 h using 527.4 MB and 1.32 h using 227.9 MB, whereas a diagnostic trace
for the incorrect version was generated in 13.0 min using 290.4 MB of memory. Hence,
both the time- and space-consumption of the verifier for this particular model have been
reduced with over 99%. These improvements of the UPPAAL verifier are due to a number
of developments in the last years that will not be discussed further here. It should also
be noticed that the older version uses backwards analysis whereas the newer performs
forwards analysis. For more information he developments of UPPAAL we refer the reader
to [1,7,19].
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a case-study where the verification tool UPPAAL is used
to verify an industrial audio-control protocol with bus-collision handling by Philips. The
protocol has received a lot of attention in the formal methods research community (see
e.g. [8,9,16]) and simplified versions of the protocol without the handling of bus collisions
have previously been analysed by several research teams, with and without support from
automatic tools.
As verification results we have shown that the protocol behaves correctly if the error
on all timing is bound to ±5%, and incorrectly if the error is ±6%. Furthermore, using
UPPAAL’s ability to generate diagnostic traces we have been able to study error scenarios
in an incorrect version of the protocol actually implemented by Philips.
In this paper we have also introduced the notion of so-called committed locations which
allows for more accurate modelling of atomic behaviours. More importantly, it is also
utilised to guide the state-space exploration of the model checker to avoid exploring un-
necessary interleavings of independent transitions. Our experimental results demonstrate
considerable time and space-savings of the modified model checking algorithm. In fact, due
to the huge time and memory-requirement, it was impossible to check certain properties of
the protocol before the introduction of committed locations, and now it takes only seconds.
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